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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
Three cases were decided by the Louisiana supreme court involv-
ing suit between members of the same family for an accident occur-
ring in another state. In the most important case, Jagers v. Royal
Indemnity Co., I on a conflict of laws point, the court rejected the lex
loci rule followed in Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. 2 and
adopted the "vested rights" theory of applying the law of the forum.
The court acknowledged with apparent approval the finding of
the court of appeal that Louisiana law did not prohibit an action by
a mother against her adult son for her damages arising out of an
accident which occurred as a result of the son's negligence while he
was a minor. This rule was established in Deshotel v. Travelers In-
demnity Co.,' involving an action by a father against the liability
insurer of his negligent minor son. However, the instant case allowed
judgment not only against plaintiff's liability insurer, but also
against the son individually for an amount in excess of the insurance
coverage. Specifically, the court held: "We find no impediment to a
suit by a parent against her minor child for a tort committed during
his minority."'
In Romero v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,5 a
Louisiana domiciled husband and wife were injured in an automobile
accident in Texas. The wife subsequently instituted suit in Louisiana
against the husband's liability insurer under the direct action stat-
ute. The trial court found the husband negligent and awarded dam-
ages to the wife for her pain and suffering. The direct action against
the insurer for an out-of-state accident was allowed under the rule of
Webb v. Zurich Insurance Co.,' in which that interpretation was first
made of our direct action statute. The court of appeal reversed the
trial court on the grounds that Texas law should apply, which neither
allows a direct action against the insurer nor an action by a wife
against her husband. The supreme court, in reversing the court of
appeal, noted the recent Jagers case, in which it was announced that
in such circumstances the law of Louisiana would be applied. It is
well established in Louisiana that while the wife may not sue her
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 276 So. 2d 309 (La. 1973).
2. 256 La. 289, 236 So. 2d 216 (1970).
3. 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971).
4. 276 So. 2d at 313.
5. 277 So. 2d 649 (La. 1973).
6. 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
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husband individually in tort, the bar is personal to the husband and
may not be claimed by his liability insurer.
In McNeal v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,7 the
suit was by Mrs. McNeal individually and in behalf of her minor
daughter against her husband's insurer. While the family was return-
ing to their Louisiana home from an automobile trip to Tennessee,
Mr. McNeal lost control of his vehicle and an accident ensued, with
the resulting injuries to Mrs. McNeal and her daughter, and the
death of Mr. McNeal. While the Louisiana suit was pending, Mrs.
McNeal brought a suit in Mississippi on the same cause of action.
The Mississippi court dismissed the suit on the ground that the wife
and minor daughter had no standing to maintain a civil suit against
the husband's estate because of the Mississippi family immunity
doctrine. The action against the liability insurer was dismissed be-
cause the direct action is not available in Mississippi. The Louisiana
trial court maintained an exception of resjudicata filed by the insurer
in the Louisiana proceeding following the Mississippi decision. The
Louisiana supreme court, noting their recent Jagers opinion, re-
versed, holding that there was no bar to the action in Louisiana. The
exception of res judicata was thus overruled on the grounds that the
Mississippi judgment did not decide the case on the merits and was
not properly res judicata. It should be noted that the court of appeal
decisions in Romero and McNeal were rendered prior to the handing
down of Jagers.
TORT ANALYSIS-STATUTORY STANDARD OF CARE
In Laird v. Travelers Insurance Co.,8 plaintiff Laird, with his wife
as a passenger, parked his pickup truck partly on the asphalt portion
of a highway and was struck from the rear by a truck-trailer owned
by the Red River News Co. The Lairds sued for their damages. It was
found that their vehicle did not completely obstruct the highway,
thus leaving room in the Lairds' lane for a vehicle to pass safely.
Additionally, at the time of the accident the oncoming lane was clear
of traffic. It was further found that the Red River News driver was
inattentive and failed to notice the Lairds' truck in spite of its easy
visibility and the frantic efforts of a third party to signal the driver
of the presence of the stopped truck.
R.S. 32:141(A) provides that no person shall park a vehicle upon
the paved part of a highway when it is practicable to park off that
7. 278 So. 2d 108 (La. 1973).
8. 263 La. 199, 267 So. 2d 714 (1972).
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part of the highway. It is construed to be a criminal statute because
of the sanctions provided for its violation. Under the jurisprudence,
criminal statutes do not have the force of law in setting standards for
civil liability, although the court may adopt as the civil standard of
care the one set out in the criminal statute.
Having decided that the criminal statute must be considered,
the court used the duty-risk analysis enunciated in Hill v. Lundin &
Associates, Inc.,' applying it here to a standard derived from a statu-
tory rule, rather than to a judge-formulated rule as in Hill. The court
then found that the presence of the Laird truck was a cause of the
collision, since obviously it would not have occurred but for the
truck's presence.
The crucial inquiry which followed was whether Laird owed a
duty to himself, to his wife, or to the Red River News driver to protect
them against any harm resulting from the risk arising from the park-
ing of his truck on the highway. The court answered the duty question
as to all three parties in the negative by finding that the highway was
not obstructed in the sense contemplated by the statute. The court
reasoned that the duty imposed, when one considers the purpose of
the criminal statute, did not encompass the particular risk encoun-
tered. The court accordingly affirmed judgments in favor of Mr. and
Mrs. Laird for their damages.
It should be noted that when there is a civil statute regulating
conduct in a given endeavor, the analysis of the applicability of the
statute takes the following form:
(1) Is the plaintiff within the class of persons afforded protec-
tion under the statute?
(2) Is the type of harm by which the plaintiff was injured within
the protection afforded by the statute?
(3) Is the plaintiff's interest injured by the harm one protected
by the statute?
If under the foregoing analysis it is determined that the statute is
applicable, the same determination has been made as is accom-
plished by the duty-risk analysis. Customarily, a violation of an appl-
icable statute is negligence per se.
In the same vein, in Smolinski v. Taulli,10 the supreme court
noted that a stairway and guard railing were unreaponably dangerous
and held a landlord liable for the serious injury suffered by a child
who fell through the guard railing. The court found that the stairway
and hand-rail were constructed in violation of the Jefferson Parish
9. 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
10. 276 So. 2d 286 (La. 1973).
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Building Code and of a building ordinance of the City of Gretna.
While it may be concluded that the civil standard of care was adopted
by analogy from the provision of the two building codes, the court
seemed to base its finding of liability principally on their conclusion
that the stairway and landing were not reasonably safe for the in-
tended use by persons, especially children, whom the landlord-owner
could reasonably foresee would use it.
Continuing on the subject of application of statutes to determine
the civil standard of care, the court in Weber v. Phoenix Assurance
Company of New York" continued weaving the fabric of its analysis
by pointing out that when the court adopts for a civil standard of care
the provisions of a penal statute, it is improper to say that the viola-
tion constitutes "negligence per se" in a civil action. The term "negli-
gence per se" is properly used when it is found that a civil statute is
applicable to defendant's conduct and upon a factual determination
that defendant violated that statute with his conduct. It may be
found that no further weighing of the circumstances is required to
conclude that defendant was negligent, for having determined that
the statute is applicable, and that it was breached, the finding of
negligence is mandatory, since, by definition, violation of the appro-
priate standard of care is the creation of an unreasonable risk, which
in turn is the bedrock definition of negligence.
In Odom v. Hooper,2 a plaintiffs action was dismissed on defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment because the trial court con-
cluded that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, since the pleadings showed that decedent collided with
the nineteenth boxcar in a train which had preempted the intersec-
tion. "Negligence as a matter of law," arises when the jurisprudence
invariably finds negligence in a well-delimited set of circumstances,
and serves the same purpose that the term "negligence per se" serves
for violation of applicable civil statutes.
The supreme court reversed, overturning the summary judg-
ment. After analyzing the jurisprudence "on negligence as a matter
of law," the court concluded that with the change in highway condi-
tions and other factors involved in the operating of automobiles, there
should no longer be a hard and fast rule in a given category of acci-
dent, but that a consideration of the facts in each case should govern
the question of liability. This reasoning is much the same as that used
to abrogate the assured clear distance rule, to which the instant case
was analogized.
11. 273 So. 2d 30 (La. 1973).
12. 273 So. 2d 510 (La. 1973).
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SCOPE OF PROTECTION UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATORY STATUTES
In Brantley v. Brown, 3 the supreme court found a twelve-year-
old boy free of contributory negligence in an action seeking to recover
damages for injuries the boy suffered as a result of an intersectional
collision involving the car on whose fender the boy was riding. Bran-
tley, the boy, was riding on the fender of a car driven by Brown. The
other car in the collision was driven by Myles. The court found that
the Myles vehicle negligently entered the right of way path of the
Brown vehicle. Brown threw on his brakes and Brantley was thrown
into the Myles vehicle just prior to the collison.
In considering whether Brantley was contributorily negligent,
the court interpreted the fender-riding statute, R.S. 32:284 and con-
cluded that
[t]he principles uniformly applied by these cases are: An outri-
der on a vehicle assumes only such risks as are ordinarily incident
to his position. He does not assume the risk of negligent driving
on the part of his driver, as he is ordinarily entitled to rely reason-
ably upon his driver's exercise of ordinary care. He particularly
does not assume the risk of the negligence of the driver of another
vehicle which collides with that upon which he is riding: any
negligence on the outrider's part does not causally contribute to
such an accident or to his injuries thereby resulting, for in the
absence of the other driver's negligence there would have been no
accident thus no injury at all . . .,
It is difficult to imagine conduct more pregnant with negligence
than riding on the fender of an automobile at 25 miles per hour. The
only apparent reason this writer can deduce for the restrictive inter-
pretation of the fender-rider statute is that otherwise the statute
would make a fender-rider a sitting duck for the near intentional
whimsy of his driver or of another driver wishing to have sport on the
occasion. If the court's interpretation were otherwise, would not the
fender-rider be invariably without an action, being barred by his
contributory negligence?
The holding, however, smacks of injustice to Myles. Without
reference to the regulatory statute, did not Brantley violate the stan-
dard of care which an ordinary, reasonable and prudent twelve-year-
old must observe to avoid injury to himself? Is not the fender-riding
at 25 miles per hour the creation of an unreasonable risk of injury to
one's self? The conduct has no social utility or value whatever, and
13. 277 So. 2d 141 (La. 1973).
14. Id. at 143.
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the burden of prevention is attractively small. The risk which mater-
ialized seems to be precisely that which any reasonable man would
envision as one of the probable consequences of fender-riding.
Perhaps by holding fender-riders to be non-contributorily negli-
gent if the slightest negligence is found on the part of the fender-
rider's driver, the great likelihood of liability deters drivers from al-
lowing fender-riding on their vehicles. However, that consideration is
inapplicable to the action by Brantley against Myles. Fender-riding
in this motorized age is so fraught with peril that it might best be
deterred by letting fender-riders bear their own losses. It seems unjust
to draw Myles into the negligence picture and then interpret the
statute to preclude the defense of contributory negligence on the basis
of a statute which does not even apply to Myles.
The Louisiana supreme court in Matte v. Continental Trailways,
Inc."s construed the scope of protection of a motor vehicle statute
regulating the use of headlights to include a pedestrian who had just
alighted from a bus and was struck and killed by another driver
claiming to be blinded by the bus's headlights. The action was
brought by the survivors of the decedent. According to the petition,
as the decedent descended from the bus and attempted to cross the
highway, the bus turned toward an approaching vehicle so that the
bus's headlights blinded the oncoming driver, causing him to strike
and kill the decedent. Petitioner sued the oncoming driver, Gaudet,
the bus company, and McNeil, the driver of the bus. Gaudet then
filed a third party action against McNeil and the bus company in the
event Gaudet was cast in judgment. The instant decision was ren-
dered on the exception of no cause of action filed by the third party
defendants to Gaudet's third party demand. The supreme court held
that while the carrier-passenger relationship had terminated when
the decedent safely alighted from the bus, the scope of protection
under the headlight statute extended to the decedent as a pedestrian
since "the object of the statute is to protect not only motorists di-
rectly affected but others to whom harm might reasonably be ex-
pected to result from the violation of the statute."' 6
Ordinarily, motor vehicle regulatory statutes are construed to be
for the benefit of other motorists. However, the consequences from
negligent driving are obviously so widespread that the court's broad-
ened interpretation of these statutes is eminently correct and benefi-
cial to society. While the court did not discuss the statutes in terms
of adopting a standard of care for civil litigation purposes, it is as-
15. 278 So. 2d 60 (La. 1973).
16. Id. at 63.
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sumed that the opinion does not depart from the decisions discussed
above.
RES IPSA LoQUITUR-DoCTORS AND HOSPITALS
In McCann v. Baton Rouge General Hospital," the Louisiana
supreme court reviewed the dismissal on an exception of no cause of
action of a suit to recover damages for the injuries suffered by a
fourteen-year-old boy who was taken to the hospital for the treatment
of a fractured elbow. After the boy was given an anesthetic and was
treated by a surgeon in the hospital operating room, he was returned
to his room. It was then discovered that he had suffered injuries
completely unconnected with the treatment of his elbow. The suit
was brought against the doctor, the hospital, and their insurers. The
trial court sustained the exception of no cause of action in behalf of
the doctor and his insurer. The question before the supreme court was
whether to uphold the dismissal of the doctor.
The allegations of the petition were clearly lacking the specific
charges of negligence necessary to sustain an action against the doc-
tor in tort. However, it is also clear that there was no possible way
the facts surrounding the alleged injury could be known to the plain-
tiff. Without the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, the petition would
not state a cause of action.
The court reversed, holding that
[wihen, as here, the injury occurred within the confines of the
special service rooms at the hospital, the failure to allege the
specific acts of the defendant producing the injury cannot vitiate
the cause of action. The surrounding circumstances are peculiarly
within the knowledge of the defendants or their employees and
unavailable to plaintiff.'8
Further, the court pointed out that
[tihe vital facts alleged are that the body of the injured youth
was in the exclusive custody of the several defendants. During
that time, while under anesthesia, he received injuries to a part
of the body not involved in the surgery. Under these circumstan-
ces, a cause of action is stated against the operating surgeon. The
application of res ipsa loquitur and evidentiary doctrine, must,
of course, be determined at the conclusion of the trial.'"
17. 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973).
18. Id. at 261.
19. Id. at 262.
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Without the application of res ipsa loquitur to this type situa-
tion, a plaintiff is effectively without a cause of action. Even though
it would be possible after suit was filed to undertake discovery and
ferret out the facts, the inability to allege specific negligence would
expose the petition to dismissal on an exception of no cause of action;
thus, the opportunity to use discovery would never arise. It must also
be noted that in this type situation the right to use discovery proce-
dures by no means assures that the facts will become known. The
effect of the applicability of res ipsa loquitur forces the defendants
to come forward with some explanation.
The court wisely pretermitted any attempt future plaintiffs
might make for promiscuous use of res ipsa loquitur in the field of
medical malpractice. The court said
we in no way sanction the application of res ipsa loquitur to
malpractice cases involving no more than a failure to obtain satis-
factory results from surgery or medical treatment. We limit our
holding to untoward or unusual occurrences during the time of
medical supervision."0
MINOR'S TORTS
In Deshotel v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,2" the supreme court an-
nounced several years ago that under Civil Code article 2318 the
parent is only vicariously liable for the tortious acts of a minor child
residing with him. This enabled the parent to maintain an action for
his own damages, whether they be for harm to property or to person,
suffered as a result of the parent's riding as guest passenger with the
minor when he committed his act of negligence.
In the current session in Wooten v. Wimberly," the court held
that a negligent minor and his parent are not solidarily liable for the
minor's torts. This is consistent with Deshotel and appears to be a
sound analysis of the law, although the court was sharply divided on
whether, under the Civil Code, solidarity arises from the mere simul-
taneous indebtedness of each of two obligors for the whole of a debt.
This aspect of the case is discussed elsewhere in the Symposium
under the subject of "Obligations." 3
The court in Walker v. Milton24 applied the rule of Smith v.
20. Id.
21. 257 La. 567, 243 So. 2d 259 (1971).
22. 272 So. 2d 303 (La. 1973).
23. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-
Obligations, 34 LA. L. REV. 231 (1974).
24. 263 La. 555, 268 So. 2d 654 (1972).
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Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. 5 in allowing contri-
bution in favor of a joint tortfeasor against his co-joint tortfeasor who
was a member of the plaintiff's family subject to the intrafamily
immunity from suit. In Walker, a mother and her children were in-
jured in an accident in which both the mother and the other driver
were negligent. One of the minor children was awarded damages
against the third party, who with his insurer sought contribution from
the minor's mother as a joint tortfeasor solidarily liable with the third
party. The court allowed the contribution in keeping with their prior
rulings in interspousal tort cases. It is a reinforcing of the well-
established rule that while the intrafamily statutes bar an action,
they do not destroy the cause of action.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Perhaps the most significant torts case in this session of the court
was Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. Splendour
Shipping & Enterprise Co., 6 in which the court dealt with the sover-
eign immunity issue. The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been
chipped away in many jurisdictions. In Louisiana, the immunity of
a particular state agency or board has been determined by reference
to the legislative or constitutional language creating the entity.
In its fully researched and documented opinion, the court
pointed out that the doctrine in Louisiana is jurisprudential. Next,
the court pointed out its ruling of waiver of the immunity in the case
of Hamilton v. City of Shreveport,27 in which it was held that the
legislature had granted Shreveport the power to sue and be sued,
which constituted a waiver of whatever immunity the city may other-
wise have enjoyed. With reference to the Board of Commissioners for
the Port of New Orleans, the court pointed out that the legislative
and jurisprudential history of the particular board was that it was
immune from suit. Openly making a pure policy decision, the court
stated that in its view the doctrine of immunity was no longer useful
or justified and that they were here withdrawing from the board the
immunity with which it previously was insulated from suits in tort.
The intriguing focus of the entire case is that the court said,
"[wie hold that the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New
Orleans, and other such boards and agencies, are not immune from
suit for tort.""8 If the State of Louisiana itself, apart from its boards
25. 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965).
26. 273 So. 2d 19 (La. 1973).
27. 247 La. 784, 174 So. 2d 529 (1965).
28. 273 So. 2d at 26.
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and agencies, is capable of committing a tort, has it been deprived
of its sovereign immunity? A reasonable reading of the court's lan-
guage compels the conclusion that the state still enjoys its immunity.
It is hoped that on an early occasion the court will clarify the extent
to which sovereign immunity has been abolished.
WORDS ALONE AS PROVOCATION
In Morneau v. American Oil Co., 9 the supreme court disavowed
a long train of court of appeal decisions which have recognized that
words alone can constitute provocation to excuse or justify what
would otherwise be an unlawful act such as battery. It is well estab-
lished in the common law that words alone, without accompanying
movement, cannot be pleaded as privilege for a responsive blow. The
supreme court did acknowledge that there is the rule of law applica-
ble in this state that words calculated to provoke and arouse to the
point of physical retaliation may mitigate the damages in a civil
action, but in looking at the facts before them they found that no such
mitigation was proper.
NON-DELEGABLE DuTy
In Vonner v. State Department of Public Welfare, 0 a mother
sued for the death of her five-year-old son who died from physical
abuse at the hands of foster parents in whose care he had been placed
by the defendant department. The defense to the action was that the
foster parents were independent contractors for whose actions the
Department was not responsible. The argument by plaintiff was that
the foster parents were servants of the Department so that defendant
had a master's responsibility for the servant's acts. The court indi-
cated it would be willing to base liability upon the negligence of the
Department in failing to react to information and other indications
that the child was being physically abused. The Department's own
regulations as to periodic visits and examinations had not been fol-
lowed. Liability under this view would have flowed from breach of a
duty to supervise another who had the primary responsibility for the
well-being of the child. However, the court went on to find that the
duty of the Department to take care of the children was non-
delegable, and the Department was therefore found vicariously liable
for the acts of the foster parents.
29. 272 So. 2d 313 (La. 1973).
30. 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973).
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